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NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act,
Utah Code Ann., §§ 34-20a-l et seq. (Supp. 1975), is
unconstitutional*
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Respondents1 Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Appellants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment*
NATURE OF RELIEF'SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's
order granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and
denying Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
In the alternative, Appellants seek reversal of
the lower court's ruling that the collective bargaining and
compulsory arbitration provisions of the Utah Firefighters
Negotiations Act are not severable; and reversal of the
lower court's order insofar as it holds that the collective bargaining provisions of the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act are unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act, Utah
Code Ann., §§ 34-20a-l et seq. (Supp. 1975) (hereinafter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sometimes referred to as the Act) , was passed by Utah's
41st Legislature in its general session and became the law
of this State on or about May 13, 1975.
The Act's most controversial sections provide
that certain Utah municipalities have a duty to engage in
good faith collective bargaining with local firefighter
bargaining representatives; and that if a bargaining impasse
is reached, "all unresolved issues shall be submitted to
arbitration."

The Act establishes a procedure for the

selection of an arbitration board and:

"The determination

of the majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final and binding on all matters in dispute
except in salary and wage matters which shall be considered
advisory only."
Refusing to comply with the Act's mandates,
Respondent municipalities (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiffs) brought the present action seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Act is unconstitutional.

The lower court

ruled in its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment that the collective bargaining and compulsory
arbitration provisions of the Act were non-severable; and
that the Act as a whole was an unconstitutional delegation
of the legislative powers of Utah's municipalities.

Appellants

(hereinafter referred to as Defendants) contend that these
two specific and exclusive rulings are in error.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT I
NEITHER FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING DISPUTES CONSTITUTE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS AND,
THEREFORE, THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI §28.
Plaintiffs contend that the Utah Firefighters
Negotiations Act runs afoul of Utah Constitution, Article
VI § 28 which provides that:
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association,
any power to make,, supervise, or interfere with
any municipal improvement, money, property, or
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to
levy taxes, and to select a capitol site, or to
perform any municipal functions.
-Plaintiffs1 contention here assumes that firefighter/
city collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration of
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes are "municipal
functions" within the meaning of Article VI § 28. However,
this Court1s past interpretation of Article VI § 28fs "municipal
function" language reveals that this assumption is unjustified.
The test for ascertaining what is or is not a "municipal
function" was most recently set forth by this Court in Tribe v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).

Tribe upheld

the Utah Neighborhood Development Act against an Article VI
§ 28 constitutional attack and noted that the Development Act's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

constitutionality hinged on "whether [its] objects and
purposes ... are state-wide or local."
If the legislative enactment authorizes the
performance of activities, which qualify as
a function appropriately performed by a state
agency, the constitutional interdiction of
Article VI, Section 28, is not applicable.
This section applies only to municipal functions
... . The problem of "urban blight" we
recognize as one of state-wide concern, and not
merely a local or municipal problem.
(Emphasis
in original.) Id. at 50 3.
Applying the Tribe analysis to the present case—Defendants
suggest that there are six specific reasons why firefighter/
city labor relations are a matter of State-wide and not
merely local concern.
(1)

Presumption of Constitutionality.

Utah

Supreme Court decisions unanimously support a presumption
of constitutionality for State legislative enactments:
In determining constitutionality, statutes are
presumed to be constitutional until the contrary
is clearly shown. It is only when statutes
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional
provision that they can be declared void. Every
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of
constitutionality. Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah
53, 62, 140 P.2d 939, 943 (1943).
See also, Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2

—

Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 184 (1969).
Thus it should be kept in mind that Plaintiffs carry a
heavy burden of proof in their attempt to establish the
constitutional infirmity of the Act.
(2)

Constitutional Policy.

Utah Constitution,

Article XVI § 8 states that:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Legislature may, by appropriate legislation . ..
provide for the comfort, safety, and general welfare
of any and all employees• No provision of this
Constitution shall be construed as a limitation
upon the authority of the Legislature to confer
upon any commission now or hereafter created such
power and authority as the Legislature may deem
requisite to carry out the provisions of this
section.
If this constitutional provision does not entirely vitiate
Plaintiffs1 "special commission—municipal function" argument,
it is at least persuasive authority for the proposition that
labor relations are a matter of State-wide and not merely
local concern.

This conclusion is reinforced by Utah Consti-

tution , Article XVI § lfs declaration that:

"The rights of

labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to
promote the indistrial welfare of the state."

Consonant

with this policy declaration, this Court has noted that State
minimum wage legislation for public works employees "was
passed for the benefit of labor and the protection of society
in general ... ."

Burr v. Childs, 265 P.2d 383, 386 (Utah 1953).

Likewise, Plaintiffs would not dispute the assertion
that establishing working hours is an integral part of labor
relations; and yet Utah Constitution, Article XVI §§ 6 and 7
specifically provide that:

"Eight hours shall constitute a

day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or aided
by the state, county, or municipal governments ..." and that
the State Legislature shall enforce this constitutional
directive by appropriate legislation.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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With power to control so many important labor relations problems constitutionally vested in our State Legislature, it is difficult to conclude that firefighter/city
collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/
city collective bargaining disputes are municipal functions.
(3)

Constitutional Power.

Whether collective

bargaining and compulsory arbitration in the context of firefighter/city labor relations are "municipal functions" can be
determined in part by reference to those "powers" conferred on
cities by Utah Constitution, Atticle XI § 5.
Utah Constitution, Article XI § 5 provides in
pertinent part that cities are to be created by general laws.
These laws may, in turn, be legislatively altered, amended, or,
repealed.

Cities created pursuant to Article XI § 5 are

authorized to "exercise all powers relating to municipal
affairs, and to adopt and enforce within [their] limits local
police, sanitary, and similar regulations" only to the extent
that the exercise of such powers and the adoption and enforcement of such regulations is "not in conflict with the general
law" as enacted by the State Legislature.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Express limitation of these municipal powers and, therefore,
of municipal functions, is obvious in Article XI § 5fs further
stipulation that "this grant of authority shall not ... be deemed
to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature in matters
relating to State affairs, to enact general laws applicable
alike to all cities of the state."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This "not in conflict" language has been construed
by this Court most recently in Allgood v, Larson, 545 P.2d
530 (Utah 1976).

The Court there laid down certain basic

principles relative to the issue of State v. municipal powers
and functions.
In Nasfell v. Ogden City, this Court stated
that it was committed to the principle that
cities have none of the elements of sovereignty
and that any fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt concerning the existence of the power is
resolved by the Court against the corporation
(city) and the power denied; grants of power
to cities are strictly construed to the
exclusion of implied powers which are not
reasonably necessary in carrying out the
purposes of the express powers granted ....
The State may always invade the field of
regulation delegated to the cities and supersede,
annul, or enlarge the regulation which the
municipality has attempted. It may modify
or recall the police power of the city as it may
abolish the city itself. Id. at 531 and 532.
According to Allgood, the unmistakable import of Article
XI § 5 is'that cities are creatures of the State Legislature;
that as such their powers are limited to powers expressly
or impliedly conferred by State legislative enactment; and
that powers expressly or by implication granted to cities
do not limit the State Legislature's constitutional authority
to enact laws with respect to State affairs generally.

See

also, Lark v. White,head; 28 Utah 2d 343, 502 P.2d 557 (1972);
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Ogden City, 26
Utah 2d 190, 487 P.2d 849 (1971); and State v. Salt Lake City,
21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968).
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In a public employer/employee labor relations context,
this subordination of municipal to State policy-making power
is illustrated by the case of Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 8 P.2d
591 (Utah 1932).

There, Salt Lake City had attempted to

negotiate contracts for the construction of certain public
improvements.

These contracts contained restrictive covenants

which were designed to ameliorate local unemployment problems
and which required contractors to pay laborers a fixed minimum
wage and to give preferential hiring treatment to local residents.
The Court ruled that the city was without authority to make these
covenants and that such covenants were, therefore, illegal and
void.
The power to fix a minimum wage and to prescribe
the hours that shall constitute a day's labor are
quite generally regarded as an exercise of the police
power. [Citations omitted.] This power is inherent
in the State. "A municipal corporation has no inherent
power to enact police regulations, but derives it
solely from the Legislature, and consequently can
exercise only such police power as is fairly included
in the grant of powers by its charter." [Citation
omitted.] Id. at 594.
The Court also invalidated Salt Lake City's preferential hiring
policy—not only because the city had no independent authority
to entertain such a policy, but also because the State had
enacted a law which ordered municipalities to give preferential
hiring treatment to "citizens of the United States, or those
having declared their intention of becoming citizens."

The Court

held that this State enactment of policy superceded contrary
municipal employment practices.

Id. at 595.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Consistent with Article XI § 5, Allgood, and the
Bohn Court's delimitation of "municipal powers" and by analogy
"municipal functions," Utah's State Legislature has granted
cities only a qualified power to organize and regulate fire
departments.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-55 (1953) provides that:

"They [cities] may, except as otherwise provided by law,
provide for the organization and support of a fire department ... ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, to the extent the Utah Firefighters
Negotiations Act is the general law of the State, cities do
not have authority to regulate their fire departments in
contravention of said Act.

If*this authority is lacking,

it cannot be said that compulsory arbitration of collective
bargaining disputes between firefighters and cities is a
"municipal function."

A municipality cannot be forced to

unconstitutionally delegate a power which it does not possess.
(4)

Case Law.

Case law also supports Defendants1

argument that firefighter/city collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining
disputes are State affairs and, therefore, not municipal
functions.
For example, in Midwest City v. Cravens, 532 P.2d
829 (Okl. 1975), a municipality objected to a firefighters1
and policemenfs arbitration law on the ground that "a classification of police personnel and their terms and conditions
of employment were matters of purely municipal concern as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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distinguished from general State-wide concern."

Id. at 831.

The Court, therefore, framed the issue for decision in Midwest
City as follows:

"Does the Act in question concern merely

municipal matters?"

Id. at 832.

The Midwest City opinion

provides an unequivocal answer to this question.
The Legislature has determined that it is a
matter of state-wide concern that the permanent
members of any paid fire department ... be
accorded the privilege of communicating with
their respective employers with a collective
voice. In our opinion, the privilege of
communicating with their respective employers
with a collective voice involves a matter of
state-wide concern and the Act authorizing
them to speak through a collective voice supersedes any charter provision to the contrary.
Id. at 834.
Likewise, in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963),

<

the California Supreme Court upheld a firefighter/city
collective bargaining statute against a constitutional
challenge which was based on a constitutional provision

<
i

identical to Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28.
The basic question to be determined is whether or
not the matters embraced by the Code sections are
... exclusively municipal affairs .... In urging
that the matters embraced in the Code sections are
of a purely local concern, both the trial Court and
the defendant rely upon a number of authorities which,
they contend, hold that all matters connected with
public employment in a chartered city are municipal
affairs [citations omitted]. None of these cases,
nor any other similar cases, relied upon by defendant,
hold that all matters connected with public employment
in a chartered city are exclusively municipal affairs
in which the State has no concern. Each deals with a
specific phase of City employment, and each holds that
the phase there under consideration is a municipal
the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library,
J. Reuben Clarksections
Law School, BYU. of Article
affairDigitized
...by .
Because
the
various
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
XI fail to define
municipal affairs, it becomes necessary

<
\

{

^
<

for the Courts to decide, under the facts of each
case, whether the subject matter under discussion
is of municipal or state-wide concern. This question must be determined from the legislative purpose
in each individual instance. In the instant case,
it would appear that the Legislature was attempting
to deal with labor relations on a state-wide basis
... . Labor relations are of the same state-wide
concern as workman's compensation ... . Id. at
32 Cal. Rptr. 838-39, 384 P.2d 166-67.
If firefighter/city collective bargaining is held
to be a matter of State-wide concern, then it would seem
that compulsory arbitration of collective bargaining disputes,
an equally integral part of labor relations where vital
public services such as fire protection are involved, is likewise a matter of State-wide concern.
Thus, New York's firefighter/city compulsory
arbitration law has been held to supersede what might
otherwise be considered municipal prerogatives because:
"The Legislature may act by general law in areas of general
state concern, even though the enactment may touch upon the
property, affairs, or government of municipalities and
circumscribe local authority in that area."

City of Corning v.

Corning Police Department, 81 Misc. 2d 294, 299, 366 N.Y.S. 2d
241, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
Similar reasoning has been employed to constitutionally validate Wyoming's firefighter/city compulsory
arbitration law:
... A city, as a creature of the Legislature,
has only such powers as have been-granted to it
by the State. Thus, the Legislature could
authorize a city to employ and pay firemen,
and it could place limitations upon the manner
in which
andW.working
conditions
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at. Recognition of the principle of compulsory
arbitration, when collective bargaining fails is
quite common in business and industrial affairs.
We have seen contracts between labor and management wherein provisions for arbitration of unresolved disputes were contained. It has never
been suggested that the carrying out of such
arbitration is a performance of a "municipal
function." Even though one of the parties in the
arbitration ... is a city, the act of arbitration is
no different from the act of arbitration in business
and industrial affairs. It is nothing more than
the performance of arbitration, and it cannot be
said to be the performance of a municipal function.
State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 746, I.A.F.F.
v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968).
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Maine has found
that:
... our constitution gave the Legislature full
responsibility over the subject matter of public
schools and education and empowered it to make
all reasonable laws in reference to schools and
education for the "benefit of the people of this
State." [citation omitted]. Except for the
areas where the Legislature has from time to
time seen fit to impose its own requirements ...
the responsibilities for operating the public schools
have'remained in the local school boards. The
Legislature has now decided to take from the school
boards the ultimate authority they have exercised
in certain areas of school management — that is,
as to "hours, and working conditions" and contract
grievance arbitration — and to give it to ad hoc
boards of arbitration ... there can be no doubt but
that the Legislature, which is the source of all
municipal authority [citation omitted], has also
the power to take back from municipal officers
portions of the authority it has earlier given them.
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association,
304 A.2d 387, 397-98 (Me. 1973).
A formidable line of authority concurs in the
rationale adopted by the New York, Wyoming and Maine courts
in upholding compulsory arbitration statutes similar to the
Act involved in the present case against constitutional
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

challenges based on constitutional provisions identical
or virtually identical to Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28.
At least twenty-three states have enacted collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration statutes to govern public
employer/employee labor disputes (Alaska, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New York, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).

At present, ten State Supreme Court

decisions have dealt with the constitutionality of either
the collective bargaining or compulsory arbitration provisions
of these statutes.

All but one of these decisions (South

Dakota) has upheld the constitutionality of these statutes.*
*See Professional Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963); City of Biddeford v.
Biddeford Teachers Association, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Dearborn
Fire Fighters Union, Local NoT 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn,
394 Mich. 239, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975); School District of
Seward Education Association v. School District of Sew"ard,
188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam v.
Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975); Midwest City v.
Cravens, 532 P. 2d 829 (Okl. 1975); Harney v. Russo, 4 35 PaT~
183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular
Fireman's Association, 256 A.2d 206 TR"I I. 1969); State ex rel.
Fire Fighters Local No. 746, I.A.F.F. v. City of Laramie, 437
P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968); City of Buffalo v. New York State
Public Employment Relations Board, 363 N.Y.S.2d 896 TSup• Ct.
1975); City of Corning v. Corning Police Dept., 81 Misc. 2d
294, 366 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1974); and City of Spokane
v. Spokane Police Guild and Local No. 29 I.A.F.F., CCH Labor
L. Rpt. State Laws Vol. 3 1! 53, 818 (Wash. Super. Ct. , April
16, 1975). See also, Detroit Police Officers Association v.
Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974); People v. Local
365, Cemetery Workers, 33 N.Y.2d 582, 301 N.E.2d 434 (1973);

-13-
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(5)

Policy Reasons.

Plaintiffs have complained

repeatedly throughout the course of the present litigation
that compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective
bargaining disputes will eventuate in "taxation" of Salt
Lake City residents "without representation."

Although

"compulsory taxation" of this sort seems rather improbable
under the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act (the arbitration
panel's decisions relative to salaries and wages are advisory
only), nevertheless Plaintiffs' preoccupation with the interest
of Salt Lake City taxpayers seems unjustifiably narrow.

Plain-

tiffs' "taxation without representation" argument ignores
other more substantial public interests in the maintenance
of sound firefighter/city- labor relations.

These other
i

interests, in turn, suggest that regulation of firefighter/

|

city labor relations is a matter of State-wide and not merely
local concern.
Mt. St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260
N.E.2d 508 (1970); and State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279,
I.A.F.F. v. Kingham, 420 P.2d 254 (Wyo. 1966). Cf. Luhrs v.
City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1938); Fire Fighters
Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F. v. City of Vallejo, 116 Cal. Rptr.
^
507, 526 P.2d 971, 981 n. 13 (1974); Huff vTMayor and City
<
Council of Colorado Springs, 512 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1973); Board
of Trustees of P. and F. R. F. v. City of Paducah, 333 S.W.2d
515 (Ky. 1960); Rockland Professional Firefighters Association
v. City of Rockland, 261 A.2d 418 (Me. 1970); Kentucky Municipal
League v. Commonwealth Dept. of Labor, 530 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. Ct.
'
App. 1975); and City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment
I
Relations Commission, 87 LRRM 2099 (Wise. Cir. Ct., June 21, 1974).
See generally 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 133 (1971)
and 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 592 (1949). But see,
City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814,
|
234 N.W.2d 35 (S. D. 1975). But cf. Erie Firefighters Local
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
No. 29 3 v. Digitized
Gardiner,
406 Pa. 395,
*
--14- 178 A.2d 691 (1962).
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(a)

It is entirely obvious, for instance,

that the nature of firefighter/city labor relations will
affect the quality of fire protection in Utah's municipalities.

See Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1938).

Many people who live in or outside Utah visit or own property
or businesses situated in Utah's municipalities.

These

people, businesses, and property have an interest in the
quality of fire protection afforded by these municipalities;
and this interest is certainly commensurate with whatever
independent interest Salt Lake City's taxpayers have in the
regulation and ordering of Utah's municipal fire departments.
Moreover, this "public-at-large" interest has been expressly
recognized in the Utah State Fire Prevention Law, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-29-1 et seq. (1953), the declared purpose of which
is to provide for the adoption and enforcement of Uniform
Codes for'prevention of, and protection from fire disaster
and other hazards in the political subdivisions of this State.
May the cities, then, tell the State, "We will unilaterally
determine the fire protection needs of these people, businesses,
and properties, and give them such protection as we think
best?"

Unless the answer to this question is "no"—the fraction

of Utah's citizenry who are residents of plaintiff municipalities
will dictate fire protection policy for the majority of Utah's
residents.

Thus Defendants suspect that Plaintiffs are not

entirely sincere in their reliance on "taxation without
representation" principles of majoritarian political democracy
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as support for their anti-firefighter/city collective bargaining
arguments.
(b)

A corollary argument in this regard is,

of course, that State buildings, facilities, universities,
and other State properties are dependent for their fire
protection on municipal fire departments.
(c)

Likewise, many municipal fire departments

service areas beyond municipal boundaries.
of this fact, Utah Code Ann.

In recognition

§ 11-7-1 (1953) specifically

authorizes the interchange of fire protection responsibilities
between Utah f s cities, counties, private corporations, fire
districts, and federal governmental agencies.

Thus it has

been argued that the extraterritorial character of a municipal
service constitutes the "point of delineation" between areas
of State-wide and purely local concern.

From this perspective,

the decisive test for finding a municipal function "was whether
the function dealt specifically with a problem within the
corporate territorial limits and which affected the inhabitants
thereof.

When the community so handles the problem that it

affects others beyond the corporate limits or the inhabitants
of the state generally, the matter

becomes a state affair."

Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2—Cottonwood
Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 192, 460 P.2d 814, 822 (1969)
(J. Callister, dissenting opinion).
(d)

In addition to the extraterritorial

nature of fire protection services—the State, as overseer
of the State
economy,
a continuing
Digitized
by the Howard W.has
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scales, working hours, and working conditions of public
and private employees.

Cf. Burr v. Chi Ids, 265 P. 2d 383

(Utah 1953); McCrew v, Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203,
85 P.2d 608 (1938); and Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 8 P.2d 591
(Utah 1932).
(e)

State regulation of firefighter/city

labor relations is desirable for purposes of establishing
uniformity.

Allowing municipalities to deal independently

with local fire departments will necessarily lead to a
hodgepodge, uneven bestowal of bargaining rights.

This

situation would invite confusion; the feeling among firefighters that they are being treated unfairly; and possibly
even lawsuits grounded on equal protection claims.
(f)

Similarly, the State has an interest

in guaranteeing State-wide, industrial peace; especially
where the' distribution of essential public services is
concerned.

Industrial peace, however, can be obtained only

at a certain price; viz. interposing balance in the public
employer/employee collective bargaining process so that
public employers can no longer unilaterally and arbitrarily
impose standards relative to working hours and working
conditions on public employees.
The Legislature has apparently concluded ... that
experience has taught that certain aspects of this
dynamic and complicated municipal employer-employee
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relationship no longer need remain subject
to arbitrary decision by the employer, and that
in the area of working conditions and hours and
of contract grievances, the interests of the
employees must in fairness be examined by
impartial persons. The Legislature appears
to believe that this much can be done without
serious disruption of the balancing of operating
costs against municipal appropriations ...
we are of the opinion that the Legislature,
mindful of the denial to municipal employees of
such economic weapons as strikes and work stoppages
which are available to employees in private
employment, have sought to avoid the disruptive
feelings of resentment and bitterness which may
result if the governmental employee may look only
to the government for redress of his grievances.
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (Me. 1973).
Many commentators have concurred in the Maine
Supreme Court's judgment that compulsory arbitration is an
effective and harmonious means of preventing the otherwise
deleterious impact of strikes in the public sector.

Among

those commentators we find many of Utah's "founding fathers."

>

Many strikes may be averted in this way and
there will be a large loss of life and property,
and I think it can be very largely avoided, if
we have a provision which will create a board
of conciliation and arbitration ...
It was always a one-sided affair if we [employers]
had any difficulty with our laboring men. They have
demanded certain hours and certain amount of wages
per month, and if we did not like it, they say,
"we will go out, we will quit." The consequence
was we looked around for some other skilled labor
to take these gentlemen's places, if they would
insist upon it. We found we could not obtain that
kind of labor which is desirable for our business,
therefore, we were handicapped and the consequences
have been we have had to give in every time. We
had no arbitration. It was merely a matter of a
bulldozing arrangement, and therefore I hope the
striking
outW.will
and
a matter as
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this is asked for [compulsory arbitration of labor

i

*

<
•*

(
^

disputes] will be put in our constitution.
Official Report Of The Proceedings And
Debates Of The Convention Assembled At
Salt Lake City On The Fourth Day Of March
1895, To Adopt A Constitution For The
State Of Utah, Vol. II, 1033 and 1040 (1898).
See also, Dayton Classroom Teachers Assn. v. Dayton Board
of Education, 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E. 2d 714 (1975);
City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild and Local No. 29
I.A.F.F., CCH Labor L. Rpt. State Laws Vol. 3 11 53, 818
(Wash. Super. Ct. , April 16, 1976); and McAvoy, "Binding
Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the
Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector;' 72 Col. L. Rev.
1192 (1972).
For the policy reasons outlined above, Defendants
conclude that the collective bargaining and compulsory
arbitration provisions of the Utah Firefighters Negotiations
Act are matters of State-wide and not merely local concern
and that said Act should be declared constitutional.
(6)

Case Law And Policy Reasons Cited By

Plaintiffs In Support Of Their Assertion That The Act
Violates Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 Are Not Compelling.
(a)

Plaintiffst Case Law.

It has already

been established that firefighter/city labor relations are
a matter of State-wide rather than purely municipal concern.
This conclusion is further supported by a long line of Utah
cases which have held that where a valid exercise of State
police power is concerned, strict construction of Article VI
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§ 28 is necessary to insure state sovereignty.

In the absence

of an express or clearly implied surrender to cities of the
power in question, the State retains that power.

See Ogden

City v. Public Service Commission, 123 Utah 437, 260 P.2d
751 (1953); Provo City v. Department of Business Regulation,
118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 675 (1950); Riggins v. District Court
of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935); City of
St. George v. Public Utilities Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220
P. 720 (1923); and Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42
Utah 548, 134 P. 560 (1930).
Cases relied upon by Plaintiffs in the lower court
proceedings such as State Water Pollution Control Board v.
Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370 (1957) , Backman
v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962),
and Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449
(1967) , aire not to the contrary.
In State Water Pollution Control Board, this
Court expressly confined its definition of Article VI § 28fs
municipal function language to "such matters [as] are conducted
in a manner which [does not] threaten pollution of water beyond
the confines of the city."

State Water Pollution Control

Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 255, 311 P.2d 370,
375 (1957).

See also, Branch v. Salt Lake County Service

Area No. 2—Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 192, 460
P.2d 814, 122 (1969) (J. Callister, dissenting opinion).
Moreover, the Court's broad reading of Article VI § 28's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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municipal function language in State Water Pollution Control
Board occurred during the Court's discussion of the proprietary
v. governmental dichotomy relative to municipal immunity in
tort actions and not in the context of the State v. municipal
sovereignty issue which is the frame of reference for the
present case.
This Court has specifically noted that the Backman
language relative to Article VI § 28 is dictum and, therefore,
not controlling.

See Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area

No. 2—Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 186, 460 P.2d 814,
817 (1969).

Nevertheless, the Backman Court observed that

cases legitimizing State intervention in local affairs are
"obviously predicated on the assumption that because of the
magnitude of the ... project, which could not have been
accomplished by a single municipality, coupled with statewide concern and interest ... together with the fact that
such act was not only general and uniform, calling for such
promotion coterminus with any city or county, but available
for many cities and counties, overlapping or noncontiguous,
there was no special commission performing a municipal
function."

(Emphasis in original omitted.)

Backman v.

Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 419, 375 P.2d 756, 760-61
(1962).
Both State Water Pollution Control Board and
Backman, therefore, reinforce Defendants' assertion here that
the dictates of Article VI § 28 must give way to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dictates of Article XI § 5 where the nature of firefighter/
city labor relations affects the public-at-large and the
State generally.
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d
449 (1967), has a similarly inconclusive bearing on the
present case because:

(1) Gord1s discussion of Article VI

§ 28 is clearly dictum and (2) close examination of the
Briefs filed in the Gord case reveals that this Court was
not instructed on the constitutional interplay of Article
VI § 28 and Article XI § 5.

Therefore, the Court was not

given an opportunity to consider all relevant Utah law in
arriving at its decision in the Gord case.
(3)

More importantly, however, Plaintiffs are

suggesting by their reliance on Gord that the entire
functional area of municipal employer/employee labor
relations should be designated as a "municipal concern."
But even if we accept this "functional area" approach to
the "municipal concern" problem, Gord has little relevance
to the present case.

First, it is obvious that appeal

procedures for employee discharges involved in Gord and
collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration procedures
involved in the present case are functionally distinct
processes.

And second —

whereas Gord dealt with the

discharge of a city cemetery worker, we are dealing in the
present case with firefighters —

a distinct category of

public employees who perform a distinctly State-oriented
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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public service.

The very statute which the Gord opinion

construed points up this distinction.*
Moreover, in Tribe v. Salt Lake City, 540 P.2d
499 (Utah 1975), this Court emphasized that "municipal
concerns" were ascertained not through some "functional
area" test, but rather by asking whether the activities in
question were "more appropriately performed by a state
agency."

Id. at 503.

Thus a more isolated subject such as

the employee discharge for incompetence involved in Gord
may more appropriately be handled by local authorities while
firefighter/city labor relations problems which have broader
State-wide dimensions are more-appropriately handled in
accordance with State legislative policies.

See Professional

Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830,
384 P.2d 158 (1963).
*The Gord opinion interpreted language from Utah Code
Ann. § 49-2-5 (1953) which dealt with appeal procedures for
certain classes of discharged municipal employees. Utah Code
Ann. § 49-2-4 (1953) , however, makes it clear that the appeal
mechanism provided under § 49-2-5 is not applicable to firefighters: "All appointive officers and employees of cities
of the first, second, and third class and incorporated towns,
other than members of the police and fire departments and
heads of departments, superintendents, shall hold their
employment without limitation of time, being subject to
discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided [in
§49-2-5. (Emphasis supplied.) Firefighters are members of
the classified civil service and are thus amenable only to
the discharge procedures found at Utah Code Ann. § 10-10-21
(1953)• Not only do firefighters constitute a distinct
class of employees by virtue of their separate civil service
classification, but also firefighters constitute a distinct
class of employees by virtue of the essential nature of fire
protection services which they render.
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Cases cited from other jurisdictions and relied
upon by Plaintiffs as authority for their Article VI § 28
claim are equally inapposite.

Plaintiffs, for instance,

rely heavily on State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955).
This case does not detract from Defendants1 arguments in
the present case, but rather it supports those arguments.
Plaintiffs have looked only superficially to the Washington
Court's conclusion that the compulsory arbitration provision
involved in that case was unconstitutional and have overlooked
the Court's reason for arriving at that conclusions.

In

Johnson, the municipality involved had amended its own charter
to provide for compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city
collective bargaining disputes.

Unlike the present situation

in Utah, the State of Washington had not expressly conferred
upon Washington municipalities the right to arbitrate as a
means of firefighter/city impasse resolution.

Employing
i

precisely the same line of argument which Defendants have

{

detailed in the foregoing provisions of this Brief, the
Johnson Court:
(

... noted ... that the [city] charter
provision [providing for compulsory arbitration
of firefighter/city collective bargaining
disputes] itself must be "consistent with and
subject to the constitution and laws of this
State." ... Although the people ... are
granted the right to set up a charter to
rule themselves ... that charter cannot run
counter to the constitution or laws of the
State which gave them the right to enact it ...
It has many times been held that charter
provisions of a city may be superseded by general
laws
of the Legislature ... Id. at 665.
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This language makes it clear that the Court
struck down as unconstitutional the compulsory arbitration
provision involved in Johnson not because resolution of
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes was
necessarily a "municipal affair" but because the State's
statutory policy of making such resolution a municipal
affair had been circumvented by the city's amendment to its
charter in Johnson.

Thus the Johnson decision underlines

the supremacy of State policy-making powers with respect
to firefighter/city labor relations.

See especially the

discussion of the Johnson case contained in State ex rel.
St. Louis Fire Fighters Association, Local No. 73, AFL-CIO
v. Stemmler,

479 S.W. 2d 456, 460 (Mo. 1972).

This supremacy is further evidenced by a postJohnson Washington court opinion, City of Spokane v. Spokane
Police Guild and Local No. 29 I.A.F.F., CCH Labor L. Rpt.
State Laws Vol. 3 1[ 53, 818 (Wash. Super. Ct., April 16,
1975) , wherein a State legislative enactment similar to
Utah's Fire Fighters Negotiations Act was upheld against
constitutional attack because:
The premise that the public health, safety,
and welfare is a matter of great concern
to all of the citizens of the State of
Washington is one of the principles the
court felt compelled to consider along with
the fact that the uniformed employees are
giving up a bona fide, important right;
that is, the right to strike and were
receiving in place of this valuable right
a binding arbitration procedure.
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Plaintiffs place similarly heavy reliance on
reasoning found in City of Springfield v, Clouse, 206 S.W.
2d 539 (Mo. 1947).
The Clouse opinion dealt with a city's power to
enter into collective bargaining agreements with municipal
employees and did not deal with the compulsory arbitration
of collective bargaining disputes between cities and their
employees.

The Court ruled that cities in Missouri do not

have power to enter into collective bargaining agreements
with their employees because:

(1) the setting of compen-

sation and working conditions for any public service involves
the exercise of municipal legislative powers; (2) the city
cannot delegate these municipal legislative powers; and (3)
collective bargaining agreements between cities and their
employees constitute a delegation of municipal legislative
powers.

The Court advances no reason whatsoever for its

conclusory observation that collective bargaining agreements
between cities and their employees constitute a delegation
of municipal legislative powers.

If this is the case,

however, other kinds of municipal contracts would appear to
be equally violative of the Court's delegation doctrine.
Contracts for the construction of a city library or a city
art center are contracts for a public service and, therefore,
involve the exercise of municipal legislative power no less
than contracts between cities and their employees.

Would

a court seriously entertain the highly impractical thought
that municipalities
are precluded from negotiating and entering
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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into such contracts because once a municipality is bound
thereby it loses some sort of legislative discretion?
Plaintiffs themselves would be reluctant to admit to such
a far-reaching proposition.

Defendants conclude, therefore,

that the Clouse Court's leap of faith from step (2) to step
(3) of the syllogism outlined above is totally unjustified.
Moreover, as in the Johnson case, the Clouse
Court's opinion was ultimately bottomed on the principle
that the city involved there had no power to bargain collectively because the State Legislature had not expressly
granted the city such power:
Missouri cities have or can exercise
only such powers as are conferred by
express or implied provisions of law;
their charters being a grant and not
a limitation of power, subject to
strict construction, with doubtful
powers resolved against the city. ...
it seems obvious that, under the civil
'service laws applicable to the city, it
must deal with all of its employees,
regardless of kind or classification
on exactly the same basis and that is by
the exercise of its legislative powers in
accordance with the conditions fixed by
the general assembly^ This clearly
leaves the city no authority to deal with
any employees involved herein on a
collective bargaining contract basis.
(Emphasis supplied.) City of Springfield
v. Clouse, 206 S.W. 2d 539, 546-47 (Mo.
1947).
State policy-making supremacy in the area of firefighter/city
labor relations is the underlying theme of the Court's decision.
It is apparent that if State enabling legislation were passed
in Missouri, providing for State usurpation of what had
hitherto been State-granted municipal prerogatives relative
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to firefighter/city labor relations, Missouri municipalities
would have to accede to the new State legislative commands
just as they were forced to accede to old State legislative
commands in Clouse.
(b)

Plaintiffs' Policy Reasons,

Plaintiffs

devoted considerable time in the lower court proceedings
describing the horrific consequences which allegedly would
flow from compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes.

Examples of budget-breaking

arbitration awards in a dispute involving Oakland City and
local firefighters there were drawn from newspaper and
magazine accounts.
Defendants cannot overstress the irrelevance of
these arguments and examples.

First, under Utah's Act, the

arbitration board's decisions relative to wages and salaries
are advisory only, whereas such decisions are binding
under Oakland's charter provision governing the arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes.
In any event, questions as to the nature and extent of

i

arbitrators' awards under Utah's Act are premature, speculative, and remote.
Second—contrary to Plaintiff municipalities1

1

claim that compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city
collective bargaining disputes would constitute a radical
and unconscionable departure from the present division of

i

(

State/city administrative responsibilities—it is apparent
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that Plaintiff municipalities tolerate innumerable instances
of State interference in what otherwise might be described
as areas of municipal concern.
For example, municipal legislative bodies cannot
easily remove local civil service commissioners, see Utah
Code Ann. § 10-10-12 (1953), and yet these commissioners
are given final and binding power to decide questions
involving the discharge of employees in the classified
civil service, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-10-21 (1953).
Similar examples of State legislation which establishes
commissions with regulatory powers impinging on areas of
municipal concern can be found'in the Utah Firemen's
Retirement Act, Utah Code Ann. §§49-6a-l et seq. (Supp.
1975); the State Workmen's Compensation Law, Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-43(1) (1953); the Utah Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1973, Utah Code Ann. §§ 39-9-3(5) and
(8) (1953); and the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 34-35-2(2), (5), and (6) (1953); and compliance with each of these laws entails considerable municipal
expense.
Public transit districts which are essentially
subentities of Utah municipalities, Utah Code Ann* §§ 11-20-4
to -7 (1953), must submit irresolvable labor disputes with
their employees to arbitration under the Utah Public
Transit District Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-20-32 (1953).
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And finally, although no special commission is
involved, Utah municipalities are required by State law
to bear the administrative expense of a dues check-off
procedure whenever requested by public employee union
members, Utah Code Ann, § 34-32-1 (1953).

See UTEA v.

Brigham City, P-H Public Personnel Administration L-M
Relations Vol. 4 No. 21.18, April 13, 1976 (Utah 1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Box Elder County, February 9, 1976).
Judging by the realities of day-to-day municipal
employer/employee labor relations, it becomes apparent that
the State plays a dominant, intrusive role in governing
those relations.

These realities likewise make it clear

that the "parade of horribles" argument advanced by Plaintiffs in the lower court proceedings is primarily the figment
of Plaintiffs1 biased imagination.
Third and most fundamentally—Plaintiffs1 "parade
of horribles" argument should not be considered by this

,
'

Court in arriving at its decision in the present case
because said argument deals with questions of policy more

<

appropriately handled by the legislative branch of our
State government.

The question before this Court in the

present case is not—as the Oakland City experience implies—

(

whether compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective
bargaining disputes should be the law of this State or
whether it will have a financially oppressive impact on

<
i

Plaintiff municipalities.

The question before this court

is whether the State Legislature had the constitutional
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power to pass the Utah Firefighters Negotiations A c t —
regardless of any consequences, fortunate or unfortunate,
which might accrue because of said Act's implementation.
Defendants are confident that the State Legislature
was possessed of such constitutional power when it enacted
the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act,
ARGUMENT II
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS
ACT ARE SEVERABLE.
The Act's collective bargaining and compulsory
arbitration provisions are severable for both functional
and constitutional reasons.
First, it should be obvious that collective
bargaining and compulsory arbitration are functionally
independent processes.

It is possible to impose a duty to

bargain collectively on the various parties to a labor
dispute and at the same time provide both parties with
remedies or with no remedies when one party refuses to
bargain in good faith or when a bargaining impasse is
reached.

These remedies can be either express or implied

and include, inter alia, strikes, work stoppages and slow
downs, mediation, conciliation, voluntary and compulsory
interest arbitration, voluntary and compulsory grievance
arbitration, or court injunctions.

These impasse resolution
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procedures, however, are not necessary to the existence
of collective bargaining*

The Legislature could have

intended that, in the absence of any impasse resolution
procedure, parties to a particular labor dispute would
remain deadlocked and fail to negotiate a contract, or that
such parties should be left to find their own remedies
through exertion of economic and legal pressures of their
own and not the State's creation.
Second—from a political and constitutional
perspective—there is a qualitative difference between the
impact and effect of collective bargaining and compulsory
arbitration.

Under a regime, of collective bargaining,

the public employer retains ultimate power to approve or
disapprove a proposed agreement, and the decision is,
therefore, arguably a product in part of political influence.

In the case of binding interest arbitration, however,

public employers are forced to surrender this power into the
hands of a neutral arbitration board—and to this extent
traditional rules of political accountability may be
weakened.
Finally, a duty to bargain collectively does
not require the interposition of a "special commission"
under Article VI § 28—whereas compulsory arbitration may
in the form of an arbitration board.
For these reasons Defendants suggest that collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration are distinct
and severable
legal concepts and that it would therefore
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be appropriate for the Court to reverse the lower court's
order in the present case insofar as that order holds the
collective bargaining provisions of the Utah Firefighters
Negotiations Act unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendants
respectfully submit that the lower court's judgment in the
present case should be reversed as requested by Defendants
on this appeal and that the Utah Firefighters Negotiations
Act should be declared constitutional by this Court.
DATED this

j> 3

day of September, 19 76.

jd.
Jepry W. James
IRVINE, SMITH & MABEY
Attorneys for Defendants
225 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-4111
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of
the foregoing was mailed on the
1976, to:

day of September,

Roger F. Cutler, Attorney for Plaintiffs Salt

Lake City, Evan Baker, and Harold Newman, 101 City and County
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Glen J. Ellis, Attorney
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for Plaintiff Provo City, Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601; Jack A.
Richards, Attorney for Plaintiff Ogden City, P. 0. Box 9699, Ogden,
Utah 84409;

Merrill G. Hansen, Attorney for Plaintiff Murray

City, 5461 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107; and J. Blaine
Zollinger, Attorney for Plaintiff Logan City, 61 West First North,
Logan, Utah 84321.
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